Afghanistan — Aid Versus Drugs

While no conditions should be tied to the delivery of food aid, this is a crucial step in building a sustainable political and economic framework for the shattered nation. Some Afghan leaders — including, unfortunately, interim President Hamid Karzai — argue that economic development must come before effective poppy eradication measures can be implemented.

1. “An unholy alliance exists between drugs and quasi-feudal rulers in Afghanistan. That is precisely why financial and political pressure from donor countries is such a crucial ingredient in eradicating Afghanistan’s opium production.”

2. “Without such conditionality, it will be impossible to keep the drug lords — who have ample financial resources and no interest in stable democratic institutions — in check.”

3. “Afghan war lords are keen to use current and future drug profits to rig Afghanistan in their favor. They want to keep the country from rebuilding its economy and developing democratic structures. There is no need for donor countries to even spend one dime of financial aid if they allow that to happen.”

4. “That is the lesson learned in Russia, where the ascendancy of corrupt and criminal oligarchs was a severe roadblock in the transition to a democratic and transparent system. The same mistake should not be repeated in Afghanistan.”

5. “With hundreds of thousands of Afghans near starvation, it is absurd that any of the country’s very scarce arable land should be used to grow poppies — rather than crops that can be used to feed people and livestock.”

All five points above can be attributed as quotes to:
Stephan Richter, Publisher of theGlobalist and President of The Globalist Research Center.

1. What has Afghanistan’s government done on the issue so far?

To head off such linkage, interim President Hamid Karzai just announced the banning of the cultivation, production or trafficking of narcotics. That act of declaratory politics, however, does not add up to much.

Experience shows that talk is cheap in Afghanistan, and there are serious doubts that Mr. Karzai is willing — or rather able — to enforce his own decree. After all, he has to contend with the interests of powerful warlords who are the key profiteers from the drug trade.

2. What are the political advantages of such a linkage?

The unholy alliance between drugs and quasi-feudal rulers in Afghanistan is precisely why financial and political pressure from donor countries is such a crucial ingredient in eradicating Afghanistan’s opium production. Crucially, such a move would allow Mr. Karzai to “blame” the West for the strict linkage, thus deflecting political pressure off himself.

3. Why does it make sense to put conditionality before rebuilding?

Some argue that establishing such a form of conditionality is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. First, we must rebuild Afghanistan, they argue, then we can turn to challenges such as eradicating the opium scourge.

But there are many reasons to doubt that this is the best sequence of events. Let’s start with the question of who will use the proceeds of the drug sales and for what purpose. In any transitional — and highly fluid — situation such as the one faced by Afghanistan, one must be wary of whom exactly among the domestic players has ample financial resources at this early stage — and for what purposes they are being deployed.

People involved in the drug trade are not exactly pillars of society upon whose reliable shoulders one would want to rebuild a shattered country. In fact, rather the opposite is the case. These shadowy figures typically use their ill-gotten profits for further illicit purposes, effectively undermining the building of honest and dependable political and economic structures in their societies.

4. Are there past experiences with such situations?

Ironically, Russia — which had its own disastrous Afghanistan adventure — learned that same lesson after the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. The ascendancy of corrupt and criminal oligarchs was a severe roadblock in the transition to a democratic and transparent system. The same mistake should not be made in Afghanistan by giving the local drug lords a free rein.

5. What proof could Afghanistan deliver of its compliance?

To enable the new government to build up and pay a police force that is up to the task, Afghanistan’s frozen international assets should be released immediately.

Donor countries cannot tolerate any laxness in this regard. If they fail, they would undermine right from the outset the very conditions all of their aid payments are supposed to bring about for Afghanistan.

6. How can the international community help the country?

To enable the new government to build up and pay a police force that is up to the task, Afghanistan’s frozen international assets should be released immediately.

Donor countries cannot tolerate any laxness in this regard. If they fail, they would undermine right from the outset the very conditions all of their aid payments are supposed to bring about for Afghanistan.

7. Who has particular reason to care about establishing this linkage?

It is first and foremost the Europeans who need to worry about opium from Afghanistan. That country is not only the world’s largest producer of this drug, but it accounts for a stunning 95% of Europe’s opium consumption.

In contrast, only 5% of opium consumed in the United States comes from Afghan sources.

But this discrepancy in consumption patterns does not mean that U.S. policymakers would necessarily shy away from tackling this tough choice. And neither are the Europeans in a position where they cannot make their voice heard on this important issue.

8. How should violations be punished?

There are some experts who doubt the advisability of this whole approach. One of the more legitimate concerns addresses the issue of cracking down in case of violation of the “no opium” rule. Would the West really be prepared to cut any aid to Afghanistan under those circumstances?

In the drug-running context, it helps that the very notion of “Afghanistan” is a hybrid one. As most of the world knows quite well by now, the country is really a complex amalgamation of tribes and mini-regions.

Most of the drug activity can be pinned down to specific areas and tribal entities — and possibly even family units — in Afghanistan. Thus, when violations occur, the trick will be to tie them back to specific entities — which may then have to face the consequences of sanctions, such as reduced aid flows.

Conclusion

It all boils down to a question of self-interest of the people of Afghanistan. They may have been too weak to flush out the Taliban regime by themselves. But they are hardly impotent as regards dealing with the drug problem — and the longer term problems, such as corruption and violence, that are associated with it. In fact, Afghanistan’s self-interest is properly aligned. No drugs equals uninterrupted flows of aid money, as well as the reverse.

A better use for scarce land

The most compelling argument in favor of this proposal is Afghanistan’s scarcity of arable land. Much of the country’s farmland is unusable because of land mines, prolonged drought — and destroyed irrigation systems. It would truly be a perversion that under the likely circumstances, acres and acres of prime farmland are used to grow poppies. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghans are starving.

Lest the world wants to have Afghanistan become an eternal ward of corruption, instability, crime, intrigue and helplessness, it has next to no choice but to impose a clear linkage between aid-giving and opium eradication.

January 18, 2002