German Self-Righteousness and the European Battle Over Energy Policy

We Germans love to sit on our moral high horse. We feel comfortable up there and love to look down on other nations as sinners, usually with condescension. And where we believe to recognize misconduct, we quickly resort to public lecturing.

As determined as we Germans are to broadcast our views and trying to see through our – often ill-advised – policy positions, where we fail badly is at listening to our European partners.

Germans always know better

Worse, we do not even listen when they present us with their very legitimate views and positions. Since we always know better, why should we care about the views of others?

Example 1: For years, Poles, Balts, Scandinavians and Ukrainians warned us about Nordstream 2 and our dependence on Russian gas. We not only ignored it, we arrogantly rejected it. After all, we knew better – until Russia invaded Ukraine and effectively turned off our gas tap.

German self-righteousness

Example 2: For years, our European neighbors reacted to our withdrawal from nuclear energy only by shaking their heads collectively.

And when they asked us in 2022 to keep our nuclear power plants running longer in view of the pan-European gas shortage, the resulting explosion in energy prices as well as rising CO2 emissions worldwide, the answer was a resounding “nyet” – unless one seriously wants to count a three-month extension of the plants’ operating lives.

That was all the German government – which generally advertises itself as the holy grail of CO2-free energies – was ready to concede. One German party’s ideological blinders simply trumps reason.

No surprise that today Germany has closed in on Poland as the front-runner in terms of high CO2 emissions. The German government doesn’t even feel ashamed. Instead, it digs itself in deeper in its utter self-righteousness.

Franco-German taxonomy gymnastics

Example 3: In the context of the “EU taxonomy” – i.e., the question of whether certain investments can be recognized as sustainable – France and other EU partners demanded that nuclear energy also be recognized as sustainable. Their reasoning was straightforward enough: It is a CO2 emissions-low form of energy.

That did not keep ever the German government, in its sanctimoniousness, from running up a storm against this. It talked up the dangers of nuclear power, while staying completely mum on resuscitating lignite coal production, the most emissions-intensive form
of energy, for itself.

German condescension and deceitfulness

The Scholz government, and especially the Greens as a junior partner in that government, talked condescendingly about France’s nuclear power plants. According to Germany’s megaphone diplomacy, French reactors were a big safety risk.

According to the German telling, it was only German largesse, via the summertime export of electricity from renewable sources, that prevented chaos in France. What was left unsaid was that French reactors were going through a regularly scheduled maintenance cycle. And, of course, come winter, French nuclear energy helped Germans over the hump when their renewable energy sources didn’t produce any energy.

What is so stunning about these German mind games is not just how self-serving and deliberately deceptive they are, but how much German politicians are caught in a web of nationalism (and self-righteousness).

Forget the nation state on energy policy

The fact that the EU’s energy policy must be thought about, planned for and executed at least on a Europe-wide scale – but definitely not the nation state scale – evidently befuddles German policy makers.

In the end, as much as the German government huffed and puffed in trying to block France’s desire to have nuclear power to be deemed EU taxonomy compliant, it justifiably got nothing but a bloody nose.

Bad blood in France

No wonder there was – and is – also bad blood. Many people in France simply do not buy our assumption of moral supremacy.

Sentiments about competitiveness also enter into the Franco-German equation. When it comes to their nation’s reliance on nuclear energy, you will hear French friends say:

“All you Germans want is to take away our last competitive advantage, namely cheap energy. You want to turn France into a poorhouse that in the global concert of great powers can no longer play beyond its weight class.” And they add: “That is undoubtedly also why you are fighting our arms exports.”

Germany’s blind optimism

Example 4: When it comes to migration policy, it is not only Germany’s neighbors to the east, but also the Danish, Swedish and Italian governments – including Giorgia Meloni’s predecessors – who long considered Germans as blind optimists.

In addition to the bizarre German denial of the obvious existence of pull factors, our European partners rightfully criticize us for aiding and abetting criminal smuggling organizations through sea rescue missions (and promoting them through government subsidies handed to NGOs). This has even triggered diplomatic entanglements with Italy.

The story line is always the same: With moral vehemence, we Germans try to justify our unilateral actions at the European level and want to foist them on our partners as superior and future-oriented objectives.

Germany gets it last

In the meantime, many European countries have made a partly radical turnaround in migration and refugee policy. There are also signs of a broad change of course on the issue of nuclear power.

While Finland is using cheap nuclear power to qualify for hydrogen production as an electricity storage facility, we Germans are trying to establish subsidies for our industry affected by high electricity prices. They not only cost the taxpayers billions, but their compatibility with EU law is still in question.

Most recently, Chancellor Olaf Scholz made global headlines with public statements triggering fierce reactions in London and Paris, Germany’s most important European partners.

Olaf, the bumbler

The first was his suggestion that there were British boots on the ground in Ukraine. Commenting on his decision to not provide Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, the Chancellor said Germany couldn’t do what the UK was doing — which was understood to mean providing on the ground support in Ukraine to operate Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Whether true or not, the UK rightfully considered this as interfering with UK military secrets.

The Chancellor’s predilection to interfere in UK affairs continued when he suggested that the British High Court should not allow the extradition of Julian Assange. To qualify the reactions in London as “eyebrows raised” is an understatement only an Englishman could get away with.

Being “not amused” by statements by the German chancellor was a feeling shared in Paris last week. The week had started with Scholz making several media and video statements saying he would never, ever allow German soldiers to be involved in the war in Ukraine.

Scholz out of his depth

This was seen as an overly aggressive rejection of the deliberate expression of strategic ambiguity proposed by France’s President Emmanuel Macron. In a press conference in Paris, Macron had said he wouldn’t rule out anything to defend Ukraine – not even sending French troops.

These events illustrate the widening gap between European allies in strategic defense matters and an SPD-led Germany driven by that party’s customary mix of very public displays of indignation, self-righteousness, geopolitical naiveté, narrow national thinking and an irrepressible urge to please Moscow.

Conclusion: Three questions

1. How long will our European partners continue to accept Germans’ self-righteous attitudes?

2. When will the new wave of German nationalism finally become too embarrassing for the Scholz government?

3. When will Germans collectively wake up from the dream of single-handedly standing as the apostle of a better world?

A better world that we hope to bring about without effort, without compromise and without coordination, never mind harmony with our partners.