Why Europe Is Yesterday’s Hero

The three decades preceding 2008 saw an extraordinary upward curve in the enlargement of freedom in Europe, starting with democratization in Greece (1975), Portugal (1976) and Spain (1978). And then, beginning in 1990, in central Europe with the end of the Cold War.

Owing to the freedom-oriented aspirations of former Warsaw Pact countries, there was also the expansion of membership of the European Union and NATO. It led to an unprecedented enlargement of the “geopolitical West.”

Europe takes a downward turn from 2008

But despite “end of history” optimism, Timothy Garton Ash argues that European history would commence a downward turn in 2008, beginning with the eruption of the global financial crisis, and then Russia’s seizure of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia.

Then followed a cascade of crises, starting with the Great Recession and the eurozone crisis. In 2010, Viktor Orbán began demolishing democracy in Hungary. In 2014, Putin seized Crimea and started the war in eastern Ukraine.

2015 saw the European refugee crisis, while 2016 brought Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Since then, nationalist and populist political parties like Germany’s AfD and France’s Rassemblement National have been doing well in elections.

The COVID pandemic shook Europe badly. And then, on February 24, 2022, came the biggest crisis of all, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which started Europe’s largest war since 1945.

This marks the end of Europe’s “post-wall” period, which lasted from November 9, 1989 to February, 24, 2022. It also confirms the speculation that a new Cold War has begun, especially in light of the quiet support for Russia by China and much of the Global South.

What undermined Europe’s progress?

The United States and especially Europe only have themselves to blame for these developments, Garton Ash argues. First, they naively assumed that the positive trends up tp 2008 would continue, even though the fall of the Berlin Wall was the most non-linear event in European history – this is the fallacy of extrapolation. Second, Europe and the United States suffered from multiple variants of hubris.

Last was the failure to learn the history of declining empires. Imperial powers do not like decline, just ask the British and the French! Thus, when the Russian/Soviet empire, the largest remaining European empire, just vanished away in three years, we should not have assumed that was the end of the story. We should have suspected that the empire might strike back.

In sum, Western relations with Russia fell prey to naivete and wishful thinking. This is evident in U.S. initiatives to “reset” relations with Russia, Europe’s high dependence on Russian energy, Europe’s unwillingness to invest in its military and the openness of Western financial systems to Russian dirty money.

In its own backyard, Russia only saw ineffectual Western responses to its invasion of Georgia, the seizure of Crimea and actions in the Donbass region.

What happened to Germany?

And German Chancellor Merkel was wrong to buckle to Russian pressure and block Ukraine’s membership of NATO in 2008, especially after Putin had virtually declared war on the West at the 2007 Munich security conference.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe was left wholly unprepared, despite decades of working together to ensure peace, prosperity, security and stability. It was only U.S. intelligence that proved capable of predicting the Russian invasion.

Ukraine has relied on mainly U.S. support for materiel, rather than on Europe. Though it is true that Europe is now offering more materiel support, the shy-babies of Finland and Sweden are now joining NATO, and Europe has absorbed over 4 million Ukrainian refugees.

Europe’s daunting future

Looking ahead, Europe has a daunting agenda. First, Ukraine must win the current war, and the West must do more to ensure that victory. Then Europe’s great strategic objective for the next decade should be another great step towards Europe whole and free.

Both the EU and NATO must be expanded to include Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – as well as Southeast Europe. This is the only way to create a stable European security order and secure these countries against a dangerous Russia.

But this will require leaders of the caliber who brought the Cold War to an end, notably George H.W. Bush and Helmut Kohl. As Europe’s biggest country at the geopolitical center of the continent, Germany will have to drop its reticence and play a leadership role, especially in the elaboration of a “Marshall Plan for Ukraine.” But Germany’s current leadership is weak-kneed.

In fact, many Western European governments are fighting a domestic political war against nationalist and populist political parties, which constrains their ability to concentrate on their own external security challenges — not only with Russia, but also with China.

Countries like Germany face the challenge of displeasing their business community by insisting that trade relations must take account of security issues. And while Germany has finally promised to double its defense spending, doubling the country’s military capabilities will be a great challenge.

Conclusion

The new Cold War requires countries and regions to take their security seriously, in a world that is much more dangerous than it was just a decade ago.

Countries like Japan and Australia are currently rising to the challenge. At this stage, and maybe forever, Europe is a weak link in the West’s security. Whatever the future scenario, Europe will likely remain self-absorbed and a marginal player in world politics.